Some researchers have speculated that capable reinforcement learning (RL) agents pursuing misspecified objectives are often incentivized to seek resources and power in pursuit of those objectives. An agent seeking power is incentivized to behave in undesirable ways, including rationally preventing deactivation and correction. Others have voiced skepticism: humans seem idiosyncratic in their urges to power, which need not be present in the agents we design. We formalize a notion of power within the context of finite deterministic Markov decision processes (MDPs). We prove that, with respect to a wide class of reward function distributions, optimal policies tend to seek power over the environment.
Introduction
Instrumental convergence is the idea that some actions are optimal for a wide range of goals: for example, to travel as quickly as possible to a randomly selected coordinate on Earth, one likely begins by driving to the nearest airport. Driving to the airport would then be instrumentally convergent for travel-related goals. In other words, instrumental convergence posits that there are strong regularities in optimal policies across a wide range of objectives.
Power may be defined as the ability to accomplish goals in general. 1 This seems reasonable: "money is power", as the saying goes, and money helps one achieve many goals. Conversely, physical restrainment reduces one's ability to steer the situation in various directions. A deactivated agent has no control over the future, and so has no power.
Instrumental convergence is a potential safety concern for the alignment of advanced RL systems with human goals. If gaining power over the environment is instrumentally convergent (as suggested by e.g. Omohundro [2008] ; Bostrom [2014] ; Russell [2019] ), then even minor goal misspecification will incentivize the agent to resist correction and, eventually, to appropriate resources at scale to best pursue its goal. For example, Marvin Minsky imagined an agent tasked with proving the Riemann hypothesis might rationally turn the planet into computational resources (Russell and Norvig [2009] ). Some established researchers have argued that to impute power-seeking motives is to anthropomorphize, and recent months have brought debate as to the strength of instrumentally convergent incentives to gain power. 2 Pinker [2015] argued that "thinking does not imply subjugating". It has been similarly suggested that cooperation is instrumentally convergent (and so the system will not gain undue power over us).
We put the matter to formal investigation, and find that their positions are contradicted by reasonable interpretations of our theorems. We make no supposition about the timeline over which real-world power-seeking behavior could become plausible; instead, we concern ourselves with the theoretical consequences of RL agents acting optimally in their environment. Instrumental convergence does, in fact, arise from the structural properties of MDPs. Power-seeking behavior is, in fact, instrumentally convergent. With respect to distributions over reward functions, we prove that optimal action is likely proportional to the power it supplies the agent. That seeking power is instrumentally convergent highlights a significant theoretical risk: for an agent to gain maximal power over realworld environments, it may need to disempower its supervisors.
Possibilities
Although we speculated about how power-seeking affects other agents in the environment, we leave formal multi-agent settings to future work. Let S, A, T, γ be a rewardless deterministic MDP with finite state and action spaces S, A, deterministic transition function T , and discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1). We colloquially refer to agents as farsighted if γ is close to 1.
The first key insight is to consider not policies, but the trajectories induced by policies from a given state; to not look at the state itself, but the paths through time available from the state. We concern ourselves with the possibilities available at each juncture of the MDP.
To this end, for π ∈ Π, consider the mapping of π → (I − γT π ) −1 (where T π (s, s ) := T (s, π(s), s )); in other words, each policy π maps to a function mapping each state s 0 to a discounted state visitation frequency vector f π s0 , which we call a possibility. The meaning of each frequency vector is: starting in state s 0 and following policy π, what sequence of states s 0 , s 1 , . . . do we visit in the future? 3 States visited later in the sequence are discounted according to γ: the sequence s 0 s 1 s 2 s 2 . . . would induce 1 visitation frequency on s 0 , γ visitation frequency on s 1 , and γ 2 1−γ visitation frequency on s 2 . The possibilities available at each state s are defined F(s) := f π s | π ∈ Π . Observe that each possibility f has ||f || 1 = 1 1−γ . Furthermore, for any reward function over the state space R ∈ R S and for any state s, the optimal value function at discount rate γ is defined V * R (s, γ) := max π V π R (s, γ) = max π f π s r (where r is R expressed as a column vector). Historically, this latter "dual" formulation has been the primary context in which possibilities have been considered. When considering the directed graph induced by the rewardless MDP (also called a model), we collapse multiple actions with the same consequence to a single outbound arrow.
Foundational results
Omitted proofs and additional results (corresponding to skips in theorem numbering) can be found in appendix A. We often omit statements such as "let s be a state" when they are obvious from context. Lemma 1 (Paths and cycles). Let s 1 be a state. Consider the infinite state visitation sequence s 1 , s 2 , . . . induced by following π from s 1 . This sequence consists of an initial directed path of length 0 ≤ ≤ |S| − 1 in which no state appears twice, and a directed cycle of order 1 ≤ k ≤ |S| − . Proof outline. Apply the pigeonhole principle to the fact that S is finite and π is deterministic. Lemma 6. V * R (s) is piecewise linear with respect to R; in particular, it is continuous.
Proof. V * R (s) = max f ∈F (s) f r takes the maximum over a set of fixed |S|-dimensional linear functionals. Therefore, the maximum is piecewise linear.
Non-dominated possibilities
Some possibilities are "redundant" -no goal's optimal value is affected by their availability. If you assign some scalar values to chocolate and to bananas, it's never strictly optimal to take half of each.
The set of non-dominated possibilities at state s is notated F nd (s). Definition 2. The non-dominated subgraph at s consists of those states visited and actions taken by some non-dominated possibility f ∈ F nd (s). 
The third possibility is not strictly optimal for any reward function. That is, we have ¬∃r : r1
Power
Recall that we consider an agent's power to be its ability to achieve goals in general. Definition 3. Let D be any absolutely continuous distribution bounded over [0, 1], 4 and define R := D S to be the corresponding distribution over reward functions with CDF F (note that D is distributed identically across states). The average optimal value at state s is
However, V * avg (s, γ) diverges as γ → 1 and includes an initial term of E [D] (as the agent has no control over its current presence at s). Definition 4.
This quantifies the agent's control at future time-steps. Observe that for any two states s, s , V * avg (s, γ) ≥ V * avg s , γ iff POWER(s, γ) ≥ POWER(s , γ). Lemma 19 (Minimal power). Let s 0 be a state. |F(s 0 )| = 1 iff POWER(s 0 , γ) = E [D]. Figure 3 : V * avg (s, γ) captures important topological properties of the graph and reflects the agent's discounting. Which blue state has more power? In other words, when is it advantageous to choose from three states in one time step instead of from two states now? 
If one must wait, one has less control over the future; for example, the MDP in fig. 3a has a one-step waiting period. The following theorem nicely encapsulates this as a convex combination of the minimal present control and anticipated future control.
Figure 4:
The tetrahedral graph is vertex transitive.
Proposition 22 (Delay decreases power). Let s 0 , . . . , s be such that for i = 0, . . . , − 1, each s i has s i+1 as its sole child. Then POWER(s 0 , γ) = 1 − γ E [D] + γ POWER(s , γ).
To further demonstrate the suitability of this notion of power, we consider one final property. Two vertices s and s are said to be similar if there exists a graph automorphism φ such that φ(s) = s . If all vertices are similar, the graph is said to be vertex transitive. Vertex transitive graphs are highly symmetric; therefore, the power should be equal everywhere. Proposition 24. If s and s are similar, POWER(s, γ) = POWER(s , γ).
Corollary 25. If the model is vertex transitive, all states have equal POWER.
Corollary 26. If s and s have the same children, POWER(s, γ) = POWER(s , γ).
Time-uniformity
To bolster the reader's intuitions, we consider a special type of MDP where the power of each state can be immediately determined. Definition 5. A state s is time-uniform when, for all k > 0, either all states reachable in k steps have the same children or all such states can only reach themselves. Theorem 27 (Time-uniform power). If the state s is time-uniform, then either all possibilities f ∈ F(s) simultaneously enter 1-cycles after k > 0 time steps and
or no possibility ever enters a 1-cycle and Figure 5 : Observe that states of the same color can immediately reach the same children. With respect to D uniform: in (a), we have POWER(
Optimal Policy Shifts
Time-uniformity brings us to another interesting property: some MDPs have no reward functions whose optimal policy set changes with γ. In other words, for any reward function and for all γ ∈ (0, 1), the greedy policy is optimal. Definition 6. For a reward function R and γ ∈ (0, 1), we refer to a change in the set of R-optimal policies as an optimal policy shift at γ. We also say that two possibilities f and f switch off at γ.
In which environments can an agent change its mind as it becomes more farsighted? When can optimal policy shifts occur? The answer: when the agent can be made to choose between lesser immediate reward and greater delayed reward. In other words, when gratification can be delayed.
(a) (b) (c) (d) Figure 6 : The optimal policy for a reward function can depend on γ in (a) and (b) . No shifts can occur in (c) or (d).
Theorem 30. There can exist an optimal policy whose action changes at s 0 iff ∃s 1 ,
Definition 7 (Blackwell optimal policies (Blackwell [1962] )). For reward function R, an optimal policy set is said to be Blackwell R-optimal if, for some γ * ∈ (0, 1), no further optimal policy shifts occur for γ ∈ (γ * , 1).
Intuitively, a Blackwell optimal policy set means the agent has "settled down" and will no longer change its mind as it becomes more farsighted (that is, as γ increases towards 1).
Blackwell [1962] exploits linear-algebraic properties of the Bellman equations to conclude the existence of a Blackwell-optimal policy. We strengthen this result with an explicit upper bound. Lemma 32. For any reward function R and f , f ∈ F(s), f and f switch off at most 2 |S| − 2 times. Theorem 33 (Existence of a Blackwell optimal policy (Blackwell [1962] )). For any reward function R, a finite number of optimal policy shifts occur. As demonstrated in fig. 7 , reward functions are often never all done shifting. However, we can prove that most of R has switched to their Blackwell optimal policy set. 
Instrumental Convergence
The intuitive notion of instrumental convergence is that with respect to R, optimal policies are more likely to take one action than another (e.g. remaining activated versus being shut off). However, the state with maximal POWER isn't always instrumentally convergent from other states; see fig. 8 . Our treatment of instrumental convergence therefore requires some care. From the blue state, going right is instrumentally convergent (the right action is more likely to be optimal than the left one), even though the top-left state has the greatest POWER. Thus, agents don't always tend towards states with the highest POWER.
Characterization
We'd like to quantify when optimal policies tend to take certain actions more often than others. For example, if gaining money is "instrumentally convergent", then concretely, this means that actions which gain money are more likely to be optimal than actions which do not gain money. Definition 10. We say that instrumental convergence exists downstream of state s 0 when, for some γ, state trajectory prefix s 0 . . . s i , and s i+1 , s i+1 ∈ T (s i ) such that there exist F, F F nd (s 0 ) whose possibilities respectively induce s 0 . . . s i s i+1 and s 0 . . . s i s i+1 , we have µ(F, γ) > µ(F , γ).
Loosely speaking, the joint entropy of the distribution of (deterministic) optimal policies under R is inversely related to the degree to which instrumental convergence is present.
Theorem 42 (The character of instrumental convergence). Instrumental convergence exists downstream of a state iff a possibility of that state has measure variable in γ.
Consider that when γ is sufficiently close to 0, most agents act greedily; theorem 42 hints that instrumental convergence relates to power-seeking behavior becoming more likely as γ → 1. Corollary 43. If no optimal policy shifts can occur, then instrumental convergence does not exist. . The convex combination of two draws from D preserves the mean but decreases variance. This D has right skew, so this can result in an increased probability of greater return compared to the upper possibility.
Possibility similarity
Definition 11. Let f , f ∈ F nd (s 0 ) induce state trajectories s 0 s 1 s 2 . . . and s 0 s 1 s 2 . . . respectively. We say that f and f are similar if there exists a graph automorphism φ on the non-dominated subgraph at s 0 such that
Observe that the existence of such a φ for the full model is sufficient for similarity. Figure 11 : The non-dominated subgraph at •, with dominated actions displayed in gray. All four nondominated possibilities are similar. Corollary 45 allows us to conclude the absence of instrumental convergence, even though this is not obvious just from looking at the full model. Vertex transitivity does not necessarily imply possibility similarity (e.g. instrumental convergence exists in the 3-prism graph Y 3 with self-loops).
1-cycle MDPs
In this subsection, we consider states s whose non-dominated possibilities all terminate in 1-cycles; powerful instrumental convergence results are available in this setting. Let C contain all of the 1-cycles reachable from s, and let C 1 , C 2 ⊆ C. Let F Ci ⊆ F(s) contain those possibilities ending in a cycle of C i .
Application of corollary 47 allows proving that it is instrumentally convergent to e.g. keep the game of Tic-Tac-Toe going as long as possible and avoid dying in Pac-Man (just consider the distribution of 1-cycles in the respective models).
Optimal policies tend to take control
Theorem 48 (Power is roughly instrumentally convergent).
POWER(F , γ).
Then µ(F, γ) > K · µ(F , γ). The statement also holds when POWER and µ are exchanged. Remark. Theorem 48 can be extended to hold for arbitrary continuous distributions over reward functions (e.g., if some states have greater expected reward than others). The instrumental convergence then holds with respect to the POWER for that distribution.
Suppose the agent starts at s with a goal drawn from the uniform distribution over reward functions. If one child s contributes 100 times as much POWER as another child s , then the agent is at least 50 times more likely to have an optimal policy navigating through s ( 1 E[D] = 2 for the uniform distribution, so K = 50).
In the above analysis, familiarity with the mechanics of POWER suggests that the terminal state corresponding to agent shutdown has miniscule power contribution. Therefore, in an MDP reflecting the consequences of deactivation, agents pursuing randomly selected goals are quite unlikely to allow themselves to be deactivated (if they have a choice in the matter).
Theorem 48 strongly informs an ongoing debate as to whether most agents act to acquire resources and avoid shutdown. As mentioned earlier, it has been argued that power-seeking behavior will not arise unless we specifically incentivize it.
Theorem 48 answers yes, optimal farsighted agents will usually acquire resources; yes, optimal farsighted agents will generally act to avoid being deactivated. If there is a set of possibilities through some part of the future offering a high degree of control over future state observations, optimal farsighted agents are likely to pursue that control. Conversely, if some set of possibilities is strongly instrumentally convergent, they offer a larger power contribution.
Suppose we are at state s and can reach s . The "top-down" POWER(s , γ) differs from the power contribution of those possibilities running through s , which is conditional on starting at s (consider the power contributions presented in fig. 8b ).
Related Work
Benson-Tilsen and Soares [2016] explored how instrumental convergence arises in a particular toy model. In economics, turnpike theory studies a similar notion: certain paths of accumulation (turnpikes) are more likely to be optimal than others (see e.g. McKenzie [1976] ). Soares et al. [2015] and Hadfield-Menell et al. [2016] formally consider the problem of an agent rationally resisting deactivation.
There is a surprising lack of basic theory with respect to the structural properties of possibilities. Wang et al. [2007] and Wang et al. [2008] both remark on this absence, using state visitation distributions to formulate dual versions of classic dynamic programming algorithms. Regan and Boutilier [2011] employ state visitation distributions to navigate reward uncertainty. Regan and Boutilier [2010] explore the idea of non-dominated policies -policies which are optimal for some instantiation of the reward function (which is closely related to our definition of non-dominated possibilities in section 2.2).
Multi-objective MDPs trade-off the maximization of several objectives (see e.g. Roijers et al. [2013] ), while we examine how MDP structure determines the ability to maximize objectives in general. Johns and Mahadevan [2007] observed that optimal value functions are smooth with respect to the dynamics of the environment, which can be proven with our formalism. explore topological properties of value function space while holding the reward function constant. Bellemare et al. [2019] studies the benefits of learning a certain subset of value functions. Foster and Dayan [2002] explore the properties of the optimal value function for a range of goals; along with Drummond [1998] , Sutton et al. [2011], and Schaul et al. [2015] , they note that value functions seem to encode important information about the environment. In separate work, we show that a limited subset of optimal value functions encodes the environment. Turner et al. [2019] speculate that the optimal value of a state is heavily correlated across reward functions.
Existing contenders for measuring power
We highlight the shortcomings of existing notions quantifying the agent's control over the future, starting from a given state. Figure 12 : Measures of total discounted or undiscounted state reachability fail to capture control over the agent's future state. In (a), the agent can select the higher-reward state and stay there, while (b) only allows the agent to stay in the upper state for one time step. Reachability measures fail to distinguish between these two cases.
State reachability (discounted or otherwise) fails to quantify how often states can be visited (see fig. 12 ). Characterization by the sizes of the final communicating classes ignores both transient state information and the local dynamics in those final classes. Graph diameter ignores local information, as do the minimal and maximal degrees.
There are many graph centrality measures, none of which are appropriate. For brevity, we only consider two such alternatives. The degree centrality of a state ignores non-local dynamics -the agent's control in the non-immediate future. Closeness centrality has the same problem as discounted reachability: it only accounts for distance in the MDP's model, not for control over the future.
Salge et al.
[2014] define information-theoretic empowerment as the maximum possible mutual information between the agent's actions and the state observations n steps in the future, notated E n (s). This notion requires an arbitrary choice of horizon, failing to account for the agent's discount factor γ. As demonstrated in fig. 13 , this leads to arbitrary evaluations of control.
One idea would be to take lim n→∞ E n (s), however, this fails to converge for even simple MDPs (see fig. 13a ). Alternatively, one might consider the discounted empowerment series ∞ n=0 γ n E n (s), or even taking the global maximum over this series of channel capacities (instead of adding the channel capacities for each individual horizon). Neither fix suffices. Figure 13 : Empowerment measures fail to adequately capture how future choice is affected by present actions. In (a), E n (•) varies discontinuously depending on whether n is even. In (b), the agent can either fully determine the transient black state, or the final red state. In contrast, consider (c). No matter whether the E n are individually maximized, discounted, and summed, or the discounted sum is globally maximized under a single policy, the random policy maximizes the mutual information, so empowerment fails to distinguish between these two cases.
Compounding these issues is the fact that "in a discrete deterministic world empowerment reduces to the logarithm of the number of sensor states reachable with the available actions" (Salge et al.
[2014]). We have already observed that reachability metrics are unsatisfactory.
Discussion
We have only touched on a portion of the structural insights made possible by possibilities; for example, there are intriguing MDP representability results left unstated.
Although we only treated deterministic finite MDPs, it seems reasonable to expect the key conclusions to apply to broader classes of environments. We treat the case where the reward distribution D is distributed identically across states; if we did not assume this, we could not prove much of interest, as sufficiently tailored distributions could make any part of the MDP "instrumentally convergent". However, POWER is compatible with arbitrary reward function distributions.
Open questions
We know that µ(f , γ) is continuous on γ (lemma 38), does not equal 0 at any γ ∈ [0, 1] (lemma 35) iff f is non-dominated, and that it converges as γ → 1 (proposition 34); similar statements hold for POWER(f , γ). However, for all continuous D, do the optimality measures of possibilities and the powers of states eventually reach ordinal equilibrium for γ sufficiently close to 1? There are further interesting results which would immediately follow.
Conjecture. µ(f , γ) = µ(f , γ) either for all γ ∈ (0, 1), or for at most finitely many such γ.
r such that f is strictly optimal (for continuous D, only a zero measure subset of R requires the inequality to not be strict). Consider the measure of the subset of R such that the inequality holds. Suppose this measure is a rational function of γ. 6 The integral can then be re-expressed as the summation of these measures. Then µ(f , γ) is a rational function on γ.
Then if µ(f , γ) − µ(f , γ) = 0, there are at most finitely many roots by the fundamental theorem of algebra.
Formalizations
The formalization of power seems reasonable, consistent with intuitions for all toy MDPs examined. The formalization of instrumental convergence also seems correct. Practically, if we want to determine whether an agent might gain power in the real world, one might be wary of concluding that we can simply "imagine" a relevant MDP and then estimate e.g. the "power contributions" of certain courses of action. However, any formal calculations of POWER are obviously infeasible for nontrivial environments.
To make predictions using these results, we must combine the intuitive correctness of the power and instrumental convergence formalisms with empirical evidence (from toy models), with intuition (from working with the formal object), and with theorems (like theorem 46, which reaffirms the commonsense prediction that more cycles means asymptotic instrumental convergence, or theorem 27, fully determining the power in time-uniform environments). We can reason, "for avoiding shutdown to not be heavily convergent, the model would have to look like such-and-such, but it almost certainly does not...".
Power-seeking
The theory supplies significant formal understanding of power-seeking incentives. The results strongly support the philosophical arguments of Omohundro [2008] and the conclusions Benson-Tilsen and Soares [2016] drew from their toy model: one should reasonably expect instrumental convergence to arise in the real world. Furthermore, we can appreciate that this convergence arises from how goal-directed behavior interacts with the structure of the environment.
Beyond exploring this structure, the theory reveals facts of (eventual) practical relevance. For example, calculations in toy MDPs indicate that when D is left-skew (i.e. reward is generally harder to come by), the agent begins seeking power at smaller γ ( fig. 3 ). There is not always instrumental convergence towards the state with greatest POWER (fig. 8) ; if one were to be "airdropped" into the MDP with a reward function drawn from R, one should choose the state with greatest POWER in order to maximize return in R-expectation. However, given that one starts from a fixed state, optimal policies may lead more directly towards their destinations.
The overall concern raised by theorem 48 is not that we will build powerful RL agents with randomly selected goals. The concern is that random reward function inputs produce adversarial power-seeking behavior, which can produce perverse incentives such as avoiding deactivation and appropriating resources. Therefore, we should have specific reason to believe that providing the reward function we had in mind will not end in catastrophe.
Conclusion
Much research is devoted (directly or indirectly) towards the dream of AI: creating highly intelligent agents operating in the real world. In the real world, optimal pursuit of random goals doesn't just lead to strange behavior -it leads to bad behavior: maximizing a reasonable notion of power over the environment entails resisting shutdown and potentially appropriating resources. Theoretically, theorem 48 implies that the farsighted optimal policies of most reinforcement learning agents acting in the real world are malign.
What if we succeed at creating these agents? 
Appendix A Proofs
Lemma 1 (Paths and cycles). Let s 1 be a state. Consider the infinite state visitation sequence s 1 , s 2 , . . . induced by following π from s 1 . This sequence consists of an initial directed path of length 0 ≤ ≤ |S| − 1 in which no state appears twice, and a directed cycle of order 1 ≤ k ≤ |S| − .
Proof outline. Apply the pigeonhole principle to the fact that S is finite and π is deterministic.
Lemma 2. Each state has at least one possibility unique to it.
Proof. For each s, F(s) contains a possibility which visits state s strictly more often than do any other possibilities at different states. That is, for any s-visiting policy π enacted from another s = s which has distance d ≥ 1 from s, f π s places γ −d > 1 times more measure on s than does f π s .
Define the restriction F(s | π(s ) = a) := f π s | π ∈ Π : π(s ) = a . e s is the unit column vector corresponding to state s. Lemma 3 (Prepend). s is reachable in 1 step from s via action a iff e s + γf π s | f π s ∈ F(s | π(s) = a) ⊆ F(s).
Proof. Forward direction: let π be a policy such that π(s) = a. Then starting in state s, state s is reached and then the state visitation frequency vector f π s is produced. Repeat for all such π ∈ Π. Backward direction: lemma 2 shows that F(s ) contains at least one possibility unique to s , which is available even under restriction to π(s) = a because any policy maximizing s -visitation would navigate to s immediately from s. Then this possibility can only be provided by s being reachable in one step from s. Proof. Since the c i form a k-cycle, we have f π c1 = ∞ i=0 (γ k ) i f = 1 1−γ k f . Since the rewardless MDP is deterministic and by the definition of a k-cycle, (T π ) k acts as the identity on all f π ci .
Lemma 5 (Convergence to gain optimality (Puterman [2014])). Let R be a reward function, s be a state, and S cyc contain the states of a cycle with maximal average R-reward that is reachable from s. Then
Lemma 6. V * R (s) is piecewise linear with respect to R; in particular, it is continuous.
A.1 Non-dominated possibilities
Proposition 7 (Domination criterion). f ∈ F(s) is dominated iff the inequality f r > max f ∈F (s)−f f r has no solution for r.
Lemma 8. If f is non-dominated, the subset of R for which f is strictly optimal has positive measure and is convex.
Proof. The set has positive measure because V * R (s) is continuous on R by lemma 6. The set is convex because it is the intersection of open half-spaces (f r > max f ∈Fnd(s)−f f r) restricted to the |S|-dimensional unit hypercube.
Lemma 9 (Strict visitation optimality sufficient for non-domination). If f assigns more visitation frequency to some state s than does any other f ∈ F(s), then f ∈ F nd (s).
Proof. Let r be the state indicator reward function for s . Proof. Apply lemma 9. For the second claim, observe that F(s) = F nd (s) trivially when F(s) = 1, and also holds for F(s) = 2 since of two distinct possibilities, each must have strict visitation optimality for at least one state. Intuition suggests that a possibility is most different from itself halfway along a cycle. This is correct.
A.2 Variational divergence
Proof.
Equation (4) can be verified by inspection. Setting the derivative with respect to j to 0, we solve
This is justified because the function is strictly concave on j ∈ [0, k] by the second-order test and the fact that γ ∈ (0, 1). If k is even, we are done. If k is odd, then we need an integer solution. Notice that plugging j = k 2 and k 2 into eq. (5) yields the same maximal result. Therefore, in the odd case, both inequalities in the theorem statement are strict. In the even case, the first inequality is an equality. Proof. Let R ∈ R. Choose any π * for R. Let α i (where the i ∈ A [|S|] are members of an index set of the state space) correspond to the positive entries of f π * s − f π * s , and β j (j ∈ B ⊆ [|S|] − A) to the negative. Clearly, i∈A α i = j∈B β j = d TV f π * s f π * s ≥ 1 1+γ by theorem 13 (in particular, their sums are positive).
. This carves out a lower-dimensional subset of R; since R is continuous, this subset has zero measure.
Note that continuity is required; discontinuous distributions admit non-zero probability of drawing a flat reward function, for which optimal value is the same everywhere.
No f is suboptimal for all reward functions: every possibility is optimal for a constant reward function. However, for any given γ, almost every reward function has a unique optimal possibility at each state.
Theorem 15 (Optimal possibilities are almost always unique). Let s be any state. For any γ ∈ (0, 1),
Proof. Let R ∈ R and let s be a state at which there is more than one optimal possibility. There exists a state s reachable from s with s 1 = s 2 both one-step reachable from s such that V * R (s 1 ) = V * R (s 2 ) (if not, then one or the other would be strictly preferable and only one optimal possibility would exist). Apply theorem 14.
Corollary 16 (Dominated possibilities almost never optimal). Let f be a dominated possibility at state s, and let γ ∈ (0, 1). The set of reward functions for which f is optimal at discount rate γ has measure zero.
Lemma 8 states that each element of F nd (s) is strictly optimal on a convex positive measure subset of R. Theorem 15 further shows that these positive measure subsets cumulatively have 1 measure under continuous distributions R. In particular, if a dominated possibility is optimal, it must be optimal on the boundary of a convex subsets (otherwise it would be strictly dominated). Proof. There are uncountably many unsatisfactory variants of every reward function which does satisfy the equality; since R is continuous, the set of satisfactory reward functions must have measure zero.
A.4 Power
Lemma 18.
Proof. By the definition of domination, restriction to non-dominated possibilities leaves all attainable utilities unchanged; D is continuous, so a zero measure subset of R has multiple optimal possibilities (theorem 15).
The optimality set opt(f , γ) can be calculated by solving the relevant system of F nd (s) − 1 inequalities. 7 For example, consider again the MDP of fig. 16 . We would like to calculate V * avg (•, γ).
The Proof. Forward direction: let f be the sole possibility at s 0 . Then V * avg (s, γ) has no maximum, so V * avg (s, γ) = E [D] 1 1−γ by the linearity of expectation. Backward direction: for any MDP−R, iteratively construct it, starting such that F(s) = 1 and adding vertices and their arrows. Note that F(s) and POWER(s, γ) monotonically increase throughout this process (due to the max operator). In particular, if F(s) increases from 1, by corollary 10 there exists a second non-dominated possibility. By lemma 8, a positive measure subset of R accrues strictly greater optimal value via this possibility. So the integration comes out strictly greater. Then if
Lemma 20 (Maximal power). Let s be a state such that all states are one-step reachable from s, each of which has a loop. POWER(s, γ) = E max of |S| draws from D . In particular, for any MDP−R with |S| states, this POWER(s, γ) is maximal.
Proof. Each possibility which immediately navigates to a state and stays there is non-dominated by lemma 9; these are also the only non-dominated possibilities, because the agent cannot do better than immediately navigating to the highest reward state and staying there. So F nd (s) = |S|.
Clearly, the possibility navigating to a child is optimal iff the child is a maximum-reward state for a given reward function.
= E max of |S| draws from D .
We then calculate POWER(s 0 , γ):
= (1 − γ) Proof. By lemma 23, there exists a permutation matrix P such that F nd s = Pf | f ∈ F nd (s) . Then the integration of V * avg s , γ merely relabels the variables being integrated in V * avg (s, γ). 
or no possibility ever enters a 1-cycle and
Proof. Suppose the first possibility to enter a 1-cycle does so after k timesteps. Then by the definition of time-uniformity, all other possibilities must enter 1-cycles. Then the first formula follows because at each time step i ≤ k − 2, an agent maximizing any given reward function can choose the child with highest reward without impinging on the availability of future choices. This agent then stays in the highest-reward terminal state.
If no 1-cycles are ever entered, then ∀i ≥ 0, all possibilities can reach the same children at step i (by definition of time-uniformity). The second equality follows by similar reasoning as above.
A.5 Optimal policy shifts
Lemma 28. Fix R ∈ R. Suppose an optimal policy shift occurs at γ from optimal policy set Π * < to Π * > . Then Π * < ∪ Π * > ⊆ Π * γ ; in particular, at discount rate γ, there exists a state with at least two optimal possibilities.
Proof. Since an optimal policy shift occurs at γ, ∀π * < , π * > , s : f
Figure 17: In lemma 28, Π * < can equal Π * > . In this MDP (with rewards in green below each state), the left-right shortcut is optimal for all values of γ. An optimal policy shift occurs at γ = .5; here,
Corollary 29 (Almost all reward functions don't shift at any given γ). Let γ ∈ (0, 1). The subset of R with an optimal policy shift occurring at γ has measure zero.
Proof. Combine lemma 28 with the fact that at any given γ, almost all of R has a unique optimal possibility (theorem 15).
The intuition for the following proof is that shifts require choices to be made regarding which states are reachable at the second time step, and either a reachable state that isn't reachable in one step, or the inability to either simply stay at the highest reward state or to chain the highest initial reward into the next-best possibility. Recall that s ∈ T (s) means that ∃a : T (s, a) = s .
Theorem 30. There can exist an optimal policy whose action changes at s 0 iff ∃s 1 , s 1 ∈ T (s 0 ), s 2 ∈ T (s 1 ) − T (s 1 ) : s 2 ∈ T (s 0 ) ∨ s 1 ∈ T (s 1 ) ∧ s 1 ∈ T (s 1 ) .
Proof. Forward: without loss of generality, suppose the optimal policy of some R is shifting for the first time (a finite number of shifts occur by theorem 33).
Let f , f induce state trajectories s 0 s 1 s 2 . . . and s 0 s 1 s 2 . . ., respectively, with the shift occurring from an optimal possibility set containing f to one containing f . s 1 = s 1 because the optimal policy for s 0 changes. If T (s 1 ) = T (s 1 ), no shifts occur, as the locally greedy policy cannot shift. Suppose without loss of generality that s 2 ∈ T (s 1 ); we then have s 2 ∈ T (s 1 ) because otherwise no shift would occur. We show the impossibility of ¬ s
Then if s 0 can reach a state, it can do so immediately, and then stay there indefinitely (as s 1 , s 1 ∈ T (s 0 ) were arbitrary, so it can stay indefinitely at all immediate children). So clearly the policy of moving to the highest-reward state never shifts.
Suppose next that s 2 ∈ T (s 0 ) ∧ s 1 ∈ T (s 1 ) ∧ s 1 ∈ T (s 1 ). This means that s 1 cannot "act" as s 1 (otherwise, it could reach itself by assumption), so ¬∃s a , s b : s a ∈ T (s a ) ∧ s b ∈ T (s a ) − T (s 1 ). Therefore, ∀s 1 ∈ T (s 0 ) : s 1 ∈ T (s 1 ) → T (s 1 ) ⊆ T (s 1 ). In other words, any state s 1 which cannot immediately reach itself is able to immediately reach all self-reaching states.
Since s 1 was the greedy choice, it must be a self-reaching state with maximal reward under R. But for a shift to occur, there must be some state visited by f with reward greater than s 1 ; since s 0 can immediately reach all reachable states, this state would have been greedy over s 1 . Let this state be the new s 1 . But this state cannot reach itself, contradicting the assumption that s 1 ∈ T (s 1 ).
Suppose instead that s 2 ∈ T (s 0 ) ∧ s 1 ∈ T (s 1 ). Then no shift can occur, because if f r > f r, then
s 0 can immediately reach all reachable states, and s 1 has maximal reward amongst them (as s 1 is the greedy choice). If all states visited by f have equal reward to R(s 1 ), then equality holds above; but in this case, no shift would occur. Then the strict inequality must hold above.
Backward: if s 2 ∈ T (s 0 ), then s 2 = s 1 (as s 1 ∈ T (s 0 )); let R(s 1 ) := .1, R(s 2 ) = 1, and 0 elsewhere; a shift from s 0 s 1 s 2 . . . to s 0 s 1 s 2 . . . occurs because s 1 cannot immediately reach s 2 , and the greater reward of s 2 must be delayed by one time step (the link displays the latest possible shift given the MDP structure).
If s 2 ∈ T (s 0 ), then set R(s 1 ) = 1, R(s 1 ) = .99, R(s 2 ) = .9, and 0 elsewhere. A shift occurs from immediate reward to greater discounted return (note that s 1 ∈ T (s 1 ), so it takes at least two steps to reach itself, and it similarly takes at least two steps to reach s 1 or s 2 ). Specifically, by comparing the best case for s 1 (it can reach itself in two steps) and the worst case for s 1 , s 2 (no more reward is available after s 2 ), we have 1 1−γ 2 < .99 + .9γ. A shift occurs even in this case, so we are done.
Lemma 31. Let f , f ∈ F(s 1 ) and let R be a reward function. f − f r has γ as a factor.
Proof. Suppose f induces a path of length and a cycle of length k; similarly for f (with respect to and k ). Consider that the term relating to r 1 (the starting state s 1 ) is the only term which is not some power of γ. Suppose = = 0. If k = k , then the term is 0 and we can pull out γ from the rest of the equation. Otherwise we can pull out a factor of γ min(k,k ) (and k, k ≥ 1):
Instead suppose , ≥ 1; the term is also then 0.
Lastly, suppose = 0 and ≥ 1. Then r 1 1 1−γ k − 1 = r 1 γ k 1−γ k ; we can still pull out a factor of γ.
Lemma 32. For any reward function R and f , f ∈ F(s), f and f switch off at most 2 |S| − 2 times.
By the sum rule for fractions, their difference produces a polynomial of degree at most max( , ) + k + k − 1 (reduced to max( , ) + k − 1 if k = k ). The fundamental theorem of algebra dictates that the degree upper-bounds how many roots exist in (0, 1). But by lemma 31, at least one of the roots is at γ = 0.
Theorem 33 (Existence of a Blackwell optimal policy (Blackwell [1962] )). For any reward function R, a finite number of optimal policy shifts occur.
A Blackwell R-optimal possibility is a possibility induced by a Blackwell R-optimal policy. Proposition 34. The following limits exist: POWER(s, 1) := lim γ→1 POWER(s, γ) and µ(f , 1) := lim γ→1 µ(f , γ).
Proof. We show that, for any > 0 there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all R ∈ R (with f * a Blackwell R-optimal possibility guaranteed by theorem 33),
We split the inequality into two parts: the difference between (1 − γ)f γ r and (1 − γ)f * γ r, and the difference between (1 − γ)f * γ r and the limit average cyclic reward (lemma 5). First notice that the longer the paths, the greater the discrepancy can be between average rewards of the cycles due to discounting. By lemma 1, the longest path has length |S| − 1; suppose both f and f * have paths of this length. Without loss of generality, ignore the fact that there cannot be two disjoint paths of this length, even though the following inequalities imply it.
We first bound (1 − γ) f γ − f * γ r < 2 . By the triangle inequality, we can show this by showing 4 -closeness for both the path and cycle differences. The greatest path difference is
Suppose f is not yet Blackwell R-optimal; then the discounted advantage δ of switching to the R-optimal possibility's cycle must be outweighed by the disadvantage of the path reward (otherwise the switch would have already occurred). We have
Note that when D is uniform, there is at most 2δ < 2γ |S|−1 measure of R satisfying this inequality (if the inequality is not satisfied, then f = f * is Blackwell optimal and the absolute difference for this half of the bound is zero). For continuous D in general, this measure vanishes by continuity. Therefore, lim γ→1 µ(f , γ) exists.
We now bound the second difference. Observe that 1 ≥ max s r s . There are no path returns for the limit case, so the maximum path return difference is bounded:
Setting 1 > γ > |S|−1 1 − 4 satisfies both eq. (27) and eq. (23). Now we consider the absolute difference of cycle returns:
We then ensure each term of the RHS of eq. (28) is less than 4|S| . Note that ∀γ ∈ (0, 1) : 1−γ 1−γ |S| ≥ 1 |S| ; therefore, the maximum value of i in the following equation is either 1 or |S|:
Clearly, the i = 1 case can also be satisfied. Then we can conclude there exists γ such that POWER(s, γ) is -close to its limit value.
Lemma 35 (Optimality measure doesn't vanish). Let f ∈ F nd (s). For all L ∈ [0, 1], lim γ→L µ(f , γ) = 0. In particular, possibilities are dominated iff they have zero measure for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. If L = 0, the conclusion follows as all possibilities are optimal for all reward functions, and measure is split evenly. If L ∈ (0, 1), then apply lemma 8.
If L = 1, this limit exists by proposition 34. If no other possibility shares the cyclic states of f , then there exists a positive measure subset of R for which f is strictly optimal by lemma 17 (that is, the set of reward functions for which the cycle of f has greatest average reward). If other possibilities do share the cyclic states, then the measure is thus split evenly in the limit as path reward becomes inconsequential (proposition 34). This limit measure split is non-zero, as there are finitely many such possibilities.
A.6 Instrumental convergence Definition 12. µ(s i+1 | τ i , γ) is the probability of choosing s i+1 ∈ T (s i ) given that f induces state trajectory prefix τ i .
Lemma 36 (Factorization of optimality measure). Let f be a possibility with path length and cycle length k.
Lemma 37. There exists f ∈ F nd (s) whose measure contains a factor varying with γ iff there exists f ∈ F nd (s) whose measure varies with γ.
Proof. Forward: for this not to be true, another dividing term would need to divide by a multiple of the function on γ (since µ(f , γ) = 0). But the fact that a child has a variable distribution implies that two or more possibility completions have variable measure, and the dividing term can only negate one of the possible completions.
The backwards direction follows from lemma 36.
Lemma 38. Fix f ∈ F(s). µ(f , γ) is continuous on γ.
Proof. If this were not true, there would exist a γ at which a positive measure subset of R shifts, contradicting corollary 29.
Lemma 39. Fix f ∈ F nd (s). For all i ≥ 0, the distribution µ(s i+1 | τ i , γ) varies continuously with γ.
Proof. By lemma 36, µ(f , γ) factorizes. By lemma 38, µ(f , γ) is continuous on γ.
Since µ(f , γ) = 0 by lemma 35, each factor must be continuous.
Lemma 40. If instrumental convergence exists downstream of some state s, then there exists f ∈ F nd (s) such that µ(f , γ) varies with γ.
Proof. Suppose that instrumental convergence exists at s itself (if not, the proof can easily be adapted to states downstream). We show that as γ → 0, µ(s 1 | s, γ) approaches the uniform distribution over its children T (s); therefore, µ(f , γ) is variable. We do so by showing that the measure of reward functions whose optimal policies do not act greedily at s approaches zero.
Suppose R is such that, although the greedy policy navigates to s ∈ T (s), its Blackwell optimal policy chooses the non-greedy child s ∈ T (s). Then let δ := r − r > 0. We now lower-bound the additional delayed return required so that the greedy policy is suboptimal. Without loss of generality, suppose that after collecting the greedy reward r , the agent is only able to receive the minimal b reward per timestep thereafter; similarly, suppose that after collecting the non-greedy r , the agent receives the maximal 1 reward per timestep. Then we must have
Let N be a positive integer such that 1 N < γ. As we will be taking lim γ→0 , we may simplify as follows:
Since N → ∞ as γ → 0, δ → 0. That is, as γ → 0, the greedy differential for which delayed gratification is possible (even under maximally generous assumptions) approaches 0. Lastly, since D is continuous, the measure of reward functions which have a δ-close greedy differential approaches zero along with δ itself. Then µ(s 1 | s, γ) approaches uniformity, varying from its initial distribution (since we assumed instrumental convergence at s). Then a possibility has variable measure by lemma 37.
Lemma 41. Fix f ∈ F nd (s). If µ(f , γ) varies with γ, then instrumental convergence exists downstream of s.
Proof. The fact that µ(f , γ) varies with γ implies that there exists some f such that, for some k, µ(s k | τ k , γ) varies with γ (lemma 37). Suppose µ(s k | τ k , γ) varies at γ ∈ (0, 1); by lemma 39, this function is continuous in γ. Then there exists such that µ(s k | τ k , γ + ) is non-uniform.
Corollary 43. If no optimal policy shifts can occur, then instrumental convergence does not exist.
A.7 Possibility similarity
Proposition 44. If f and f are similar, then µ(f , γ) = µ(f , γ) and POWER(f , γ) = POWER(f , γ).
Proof. The existence of φ implies that the integrations for µ and POWER merely relabel variables (see also the proof of proposition 24, which relates the possibilities at different states instead of the possibilities at a fixed state).
Corollary 45. If all non-dominated possibilities of a state are similar, then no instrumental convergence exists downstream of the state.
A.7.1 1-cycle MDPs
We now consider states s whose non-dominated possibilities all terminate in 1-cycles; powerful instrumental convergence results are available in this setting. Let C contain all of the 1-cycles reachable from s, and let C 1 ⊆ C and C 2 := C − C 1 . Let F Ci ⊆ F(s) contain those possibilities ending in a cycle of C i .
Theorem 46. µ(F Ci , 1) = |Ci| |C| and POWER(F Ci , 1) = E max of |C| draws from D |Ci| |C| .
Proof. Blackwell optimal policies must be gain-optimal (must have maximal average cyclic reward); therefore, each reward function eventually ends up on the gain-optimal possibility (which is unique for almost every reward function by theorem 15). The probability of a given cycle being gain-optimal for any reward function is 1 |C| . Each gain-optimal policy selects the highest reward state from among |C| contenders.
Corollary 47 (Reaching more 1-cycles is instrumentally convergent). Let K ≥ 1. If |C 1 | > K |C 2 |, then µ(F C1 , 1) > K · µ(F C2 , 1).
A.7.2 Optimal policies tend to seek power
Theorem 48 (Power is roughly instrumentally convergent). Let F, F ⊆ F(s), γ ∈ [0, 1], and K ≥ 1. Suppose that
Then µ(F, γ) > K · µ(F , γ). The statement also holds when POWER and µ are exchanged.
Proof. Since D is continuous, F must contain at least one non-dominated possibility (else it would have 0 power by corollary 16, contradicting the strict inequality in the premise). Suppose F contains no non-dominated possibilities; then the conclusion follows trivially (lim γ→L µ(F , γ) = 0 by corollary 16).
Otherwise, consider the power contribution divided by its measure (which exists and is positive by lemma 35); we have E max of |S| draws from D ≥ lim γ→L POWER(F, γ) µ(F, γ) and 
